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JURISDICTION 
The Utah Court of Appeals has jurisdiction in this matter pursuant to Utah Code 
Ann. § 78-2a-3(2)G). 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES 
I. Did the trial court err in denying the Motion for Summary Judgment of plaintiff 
Premier Van Schaack Realty, Inc. ("Premier") seeking an award of its contractual 
brokerage fee, prejudgment interest and attorneys' fees and, in turn, granting summary 
judgment in favor of defendant Thomas K. Sieg ("Sieg") by concluding that Sieg's 
conveyance of a historic mansion to MJTM, LLC, a Utah limited liability company 
("MJTM"), on January 21, 1998 within the term of the Sieg's exclusive listing agreement 
with Premier, and the resulting benefits Sieg received from MJTM, did not constitute 
consideration for Sieg's obligation to pay Premier's contractual brokerage fee? 
A trial court's summary judgment rulings are reviewed for correctness. Surety 
Underwriters v. E & C Trucking, Inc., 2000 UT 71, f 14, 10 P.3d 338. Also, this issue 
concerns the interpretation of a statute, which the appellate court reviews for correctness. 
See State v. Powasnik, 918 P.2d 146, 148 (Utah App. 1996) ("A trial court's 
interpretation of a statute is a question of law that we review for correctness."). 
This issue was preserved in the trial court by Premier's Motion for Summary 
Judgment, Premier's Memorandum in Support of its Motion for Summary Judgment, and 
Premier's Reply Memorandum in Support of its Motion for Summary Judgment and 
Memorandum in Opposition to Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment that raised 
this precise issue. R. at 53; 56; 264. 
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II. Did the trial court err in awarding Sieg attorneys' fees and costs in the amount of 
$23,242.77, and denying Premier's request for an award of its reasonable attorneys' fees 
and costs incurred in this action? 
A trial court's determination that attorneys' fees and costs are recoverable is 
reviewed for correctness. Softsolutions, Inc. v. Brigham Young University, 2000 UT 46, 
1 12, 1 P.3d 1095; see also Lyon v. Burton, 2000 UT 19, f 76, 5 P.3d 616. A trial court's 
determination of what constitutes reasonable fees and costs is reviewed for abuse of 
discretion. Softsolutions, 2000 UT 46, If 12; see also Lyon, 2000 UT 19, f 76. 
This issue was preserved in the trial court by Premier's Motion for Summary 
Judgment, Premier's Memorandum in Support of its Motion for Summary Judgment, and 
Premier's Objection to Defendant's Affidavit of Attorneys Fees that raised this precise 
issue. R. at 53; 56; 340. 
DETERMINATIVE PROVISIONS 
Utah Code Ann. § 48-2b-105(l) - full text included in the Addendum. 
Utah Code Ann. § 48-2b -109(1): 
(1) Except as otherwise specifically set forth in this chapter, 
neither the members, the managers, nor the employees of a limited 
liability company are personally liable under a judgment, decree, 
or order of a court, or in any other manner, for a debt, obligation, 
or liability of the limited liability company. 
Utah Code Ann. § 48-2b -112: 
A member of a limited liability company is not a proper party to 
proceedings by or against a limited liability company, except when 
the object is to enforce a member's right against, or liability to, the 
limited liability company. 
Utah Code Ann. § 48-2b -127(1): 
(1) Real or personal property owned or purchased by a limited 
liability company may be held and owned, and conveyance shall 
be made, in the name of the limited liability company. 
Utah Code Ann. §15-1-1(2): 
(2) Unless parties to a lawful contract specify a different rate of 
interest, the legal rate of interest for the loan or forebearance of 
any money, goods, or chose in action shall be 10% per annum. 
Utah Code of Judicial Admin., Rule 4-505(1): 
(1) Affidavits in support of an award of attorney fees must be filed 
with the court and set forth specifically the legal basis for the 
award, the nature of the work performed by the attorney, the 
number of hours spent to prosecute the claim to judgment, or the 
time spent in pursuing the matter to the stage for which attorney 
fees are claimed, and affirm the reasonableness of the fees for 
comparable legal services. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
A. Nature of the Case. 
This dispute is about the failure to pay a brokerage fee for a transaction involving 
the conveyance of real property located at 273 N. East Capital, Salt Lake City, Utah (the 
"Property"). Sieg was the owner of the Property. On February 7, 1997, Sieg entered into 
a twelve-month exclusive listing agreement with Coldwell Banker Premier, the 
predecessor-in-interest to Premier, to sell the Property (the "Listing"). The Listing 
provided for payment of a 7% commission if, during the term of the Listing, Premier or 
anyone else located a party ready, willing and able to buy, lease or exchange the Property 
at terms agreeable to the owner. 
On March 13, 1997, working through a Premier agent, Michael G. Davis 
("Davis"), Marion C. Vaughn ("Vaughn") and Jane E. Johnson ("Johnson") submitted to 
Sieg a real estate purchase contract, offering to purchase the Property for $1.3 million 
(Johnson never signed the real estate purchase contract). Although Sieg, Davis, Vaughn 
and Johnson negotiated and entered into a binding real estate purchase contract and 
several extensions, Davis, Vaughn and Johnson never completed their purchase of the 
Property. Instead, on September 26, 1997, Sieg, Davis, Vaughn and Johnson formed a 
Utah limited liability company, MJTM, LLC, to own the Property and convert it into a 
"Bed and Breakfast," when they signed the MJTM, LLC Operating Agreement (the 
"Operating Agreement"). 
On January 21, 1998, Sieg transferred the Property to MJTM by warranty deed 
that was recorded in the Salt Lake County real property records that same day. In 
exchange, in the Operating Agreement, MJTM agreed to assume $580,000 in debt owed 
by Sieg, and Sieg received a 40% interest in MJTM, an initial balance in his capital 
contribution account of $670,000 and a priority 9% return on his initial capital 
contribution. Further, effectively simultaneously with Sieg's conveyance of the Property 
to MJTM, on January 14, 1998, MJTM borrowed $1,413 million dollars from Zions First 
National Bank ("Zions"), part of which was used to pay off $300,000 in debt owed by 
Sieg and the remainder was used to develop the Property. Davis, Vaughn, Johnson and 
Sieg each signed guaranty agreements for the loan from Zions. 
Ultimately, the involvement of the other members of MJTM, and particularly 
Vaughn and Johnson, did not work out as Sieg had anticipated. On February 18, 1999, 
Sieg purchased the interests of Vaughn and Johnson in MJTM for $30,000 each, as part 
of a transaction to sell the Property to Karl Malone, and made separate settlement with 
Davis. Nonetheless, it is undisputed that MJTM acquired the Property from Sieg on 
January 21, 1998, for his interest in MJTM and the other benefits he received as provided 
in the Operating Agreement, during the term of the Listing. Based on the unambiguous 
provisions of the Listing, Premier is entitled to a 7% commission based on the exchange, 
plus $250.00, plus prejudgment interest, Premier's costs and attorneys' fees. 
B. Course of Proceedings. 
Premier moved for summary judgment on its claims asserted in the complaint for 
breach of the Listing agreement between Sieg and Premier. R. at 53. Premier argued 
that, because Sieg conveyed the Property to MJTM during the term of the Listing for 
agreed consideration, Premier is entitled to the brokerage fee, and other amounts 
provided in the Listing. R. at 62-67. Sieg cross-moved for summary judgment on 
Premier's claims. R. at 233. The briefing on the cross-motions demonstrates that there 
are no disputed issues of fact, only disputes over legal conclusions arising from the 
undisputed facts. R. at 58-61; 236-39; 266-67; 290-92. Sieg argued that his transfer of 
title to the Property to MJTM "never rose to the level of a purchase, sale, exchange, or 
acquisition as contemplated in the Listing Agreement." R. at 239. Premier disputed this 
assertion as well as Sieg's assertion that he received no compensation in return for the 
conveyance, or relief of any debt. R. at 266-67. Premier also moved the court to strike 
the portions of the Sieg Affidavit and the Affidavit of Michael G. Davis ("Davis") in 
which they assert that Sieg received nothing in exchange for his transfer of the Property 
to MJTM, given that those assertions contradict the unambiguous terms of the MJTM 
Operating Agreement, which states the benefits Sieg received in exchange for his transfer 
of the Property. R. at 279-80; 283-85. 
C. Disposition Below. 
In an Order dated December 6, 2000, as supplemented by its Minute Entry dated 
December 7, 2000, the district court denied Premier's motion for summary judgment, and 
granted Sieg's cross-motion for summary judgment. R. at 382-83; 385. The district 
court denied Premier's motion to strike portions of the affidavits of Sieg and Davis (as 
well as portions of the affidavit of Victor R. Ayers). R. at 383. Also, the district court 
awarded Sieg attorneys' fees in the amount of $23,242.77. R. at 383; 385. 
D. Statement of Facts. 
The undisputed material facts are as follows: 
1. In 1992, Sieg purchased the Property from the Zitos. R. at 71. After 
his purchase, Sieg upgraded the Property with new landscaping, roofing, parking and 
driveways. Id. 
2. Sieg signed a Listing Agreement and Agency Disclosure on February 
7, 1997 (the "Listing") listing the Property for sale with Coldwell Banker Premier Realty 
("Coldwell") for a period from February 7,1997 to February 15, 1998. R. at 72-73; 109-10. 
The Listing granted to Coldwell "the Exclusive Right to Sell, Lease, or Exchange" the 
Property during the term of the Listing. R. at 109, ^ f 1. The Listing provided: 
If, during the Listing period, Coldwell Banker Premier 
Realty, the Listing Agent, the Owner, another real estate 
agent, or anyone else locates a party who is ready, willing and 
able to buy, lease, or exchange (collectively referred to as 
"acquire") the Property, or any part thereof, at the listing 
price and terms stated on the attached board/association 
property data information form, or any other price or terms to 
which the Owner may agree in writing, the Owner agrees to 
pay to Coldwell Banker Premier Realty a brokerage fee in the 
amount of seven percent (7%) of such acquisition price; in 
addition, there will be a two hundred fifty dollar ($250.00) 
charge at the time of closing. The brokerage fee, unless 
otherwise agreed in writing by the Owner and Coldwell 
banker [sic] Premier Realty, shall be due and payable on the 
date of closing of the acquisition of the Property. 
R. at 109, f 2; see also R. at 74-75. 
3. Paragraph 8 of the Listing provided: 
ATTORNEYS FEES. Except as provided in section 7, in 
case of the employment of an attorney in any matter arising 
out of this Listing Agreement (including a sale of the 
Property) the prevailing party shall be entitled to receive from 
the other party all costs and reasonable attorney's fees, 
whether the matter is resolved through court action or 
otherwise. 
R. at 11048. 
4. On about March 13, 1997, Rick Nosseir ("Nosseir"), a Coldwell agent, 
introduced Davis, Vaughn and Johnson to Sieg as prospective purchasers of the Property. 
R. at 76-77. Sieg was presented a real estate purchase contract signed by Davis and Vaughn 
stating that Davis, Vaughn and Johnson offered to purchase the Property for $1.3 million. 
R. at 76-78; 112-13. Sieg made a counteroffer that was accepted by Davis and Vaughn 
(with the proviso that Sieg would grant reasonable extensions of certain deadlines, if 
necessary) (the "DVJ Purchase Contract"). R. at 79-81; 114. 
5. The parties extended the DVJ Purchase Contract several times. R. at 
82-84; 115-16. The anticipated sale to the proposed purchasers individually never closed, 
and the proposed purchasers received their earnest money back. R. at 90. 
6. By June 1997, Davis, Vaughn and Johnson proposed through their 
attorney, Robert N. Wilkinson, modifications to their proposed purchase of the Property, 
including that the purchaser of the Property would be a Utah limited liability company, and 
that Sieg would receive a 40% interest in the limited liability company for a portion of the 
purchase price, and would receive a preferential return from the limited liability company. 
R. at 85-89; 119-21. Sieg discussed the proposal with the proposed purchasers, and 
although there was nothing reduced to writing and signed by Sieg during this time frame, 
Sieg generally went along with the proposal. R. at 87. 
7. On September 26, 1997, Sieg, Davis, Vaughn and Johnson formed a 
Utah limited liability company, MJTM when they signed the Operating Agreement.1 R. at 
91-92; 122; 170-72. In the Operating Agreement it provided that Sieg would transfer the 
Property to MJTM as his contribution to MJTM, and that he would receive a 40% interest in 
MJTM. R. at 93-95; 130-31; 173. In the Operating Agreement, in discussing Sieg's 
contribution of the Property to MJTM, it provided that the agreed value of the Property was 
"$1,300,000.00, which represents the fair market value of such [P]roperty as of the date [of 
the Operating Agreement], less the sum of $280,000 encumbering such [Property, and the 
sum of $300,000 representing additional liabilities of Tom Sieg incurred in the acquisition 
1
 MJTM was named after its members, Marion Vaughn, Jane Johnson, Tom Sieg, 
and Michael G. Davis. R. at 173. 
or development of such [P]roperty, and which the Company [MJTM] shall assume." R. at 
173; see also R. at 93-94. The Operating Agreement provided that the beginning balance in 
Sieg's initial capital contribution account equaled $670,000. R. at 173. Also, the Operating 
Agreement provided that Sieg was to receive a priority return from MJTM of 9% on Sieg's 
initial capital contribution as long as it was not repaid. R. at 95; 128; 138. 
8. On or about January 14, 1998, approximately contemporaneously with 
Sieg's conveyance of the Property to MJTM, MJTM borrowed $1,413 million from Zions 
First National Bank secured with a lien on the Property. R. at 186-89; 190-97. The loan 
was advanced to MJTM in increments pursuant to a construction loan agreement. R. at 100; 
179-85. The loan was used to finance the remodeling of the Property into a "Bed and 
Breakfast," to implement the principal purpose of MJTM expressed in the Operating 
Agreement "to engage in the renovation and operation of a first rate bad and breakfast 
luxury inn." R. at 130. Also, to implement the terms of the Operating Agreement that 
provided that MJTM would assume the debt encumbering the Property in connection with 
Sieg's conveyance of the Property to MJTM, loan proceeds were used to pay off the 
$300,000 loan in Sieg's name secured by a lien on the Property, approximately 
contemporaneously with Sieg's conveyance of the Property to MJTM. R. at 101-02. 
9. On January 21, 1998, within the one-year term of the Listing, Sieg 
conveyed the Property to MJTM by warranty deed that was recorded in the Salt Lake 
County real property records that same day. R. at 96-97; 174. 
10. In December 1998, Diana Kirk of Zions First National Bank set up a 
meeting between Sieg and Karl Malone ("Malone") regarding the Property. R. at 107. 
Malone agreed to purchase a 50% interest in the Property initially, and agreed to purchase 
the remainder over time. R. at 107-08. In connection with his purchase, Malone provided 
that he would buy out Vaughn and Johnson, and would keep Davis on as general manager 
until the completion of construction on the Property. R. at 103-04. MJTM conveyed the 
Property to Sieg in connection with this transaction on February 8, 1999. R. at 104-05; 218. 
MJTM had owned the Property for over one year, and the renovation of the Property was 
"[p]retty much complete." R. at 107-08. MJTM was dissolved on February 9, 1999. R. at 
106; 219. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS 
It is undisputed that, pursuant to the Listing, Sieg was obligated to pay Premier's 
brokerage fee in the event the Property was sold, leased or exchanged during the term of 
the Listing. Accordingly, the two primary dispositive issues in this dispute are whether 
Sieg's conveyance of the Property to MJTM involved valid consideration to Sieg, and 
whether Sieg's conveyance of the Property to MJTM therefore constituted a sale or 
exchange under the terms of the Listing. 
The trial court erred in concluding that Sieg's conveyance of the Property to 
MJTM and his resulting obligation to pay Premier's brokerage fee failed for lack of 
consideration. First, MJTM's agreed assumption of $580,000 of debts owed by Sieg as 
provided in the Operating Agreement was an undeniable benefit to Sieg and constituted 
valid consideration. MJTM became liable to Sieg for any amount Sieg would have to pay 
on the assumed debts. Also, implementing the Operating Agreement, MJTM actually 
paid $300,000 owed by Sieg from funds borrowed by MJTM from Zions First National 
Bank effectively contemporaneously with Sieg's conveyance of the Property to MJTM. 
Further, although Sieg signed a personal guaranty of the Zions debt to MJTM, so did 
Davis, Vaughn and Johnson. MJTM was primarily liable to Zions and Sieg was only 
secondarily liable to Zions along with Davis, Vaughn and Johnson. 
Further, Sieg's interests in MJTM and his agreed preferential return constituted 
valid consideration. Although MJTM was a new entity, and made no express promise to 
reach profitability, the law implies a promise to obtain profitability insofar as necessary 
to prevent a contract from being illusory and unenforceable for lack of consideration. 
Sieg asked for and received something that he would not otherwise be entitled to from 
MJTM. It did not matter that the benefits received by Sieg may or may not have proved 
to be of much value based on the success of MJTM in the future, or lack thereof. The 
benefits received constituted valid consideration. 
MJTM was a separate legal entity from Sieg, both by statute and the common law 
in Utah. The conveyance by Sieg to MJTM for valid consideration constituted a sale. 
MJTM owned the Property for over one year and "pretty much" completed the 
renovation of the Property. 
The fact that Sieg's dealings with MJTM did not work out exactly as anticipated 
did not alter Sieg's obligation to pay Premier its brokerage fee. Premier was not an 
insurer of Sieg's involvement with MJTM. Rather, when Sieg conveyed the Property to 
MJTM for the agreed and valid consideration, Sieg became obligated to pay Premier's 
brokerage fee regardless of MJTM's later success or failure. 
It is undisputed that the value of the Property, as agreed in the Operating 
Agreement was $1.3 million. Accordingly, Premier is entitled to judgment in its favor 
for $91,000, or 7% of $1.3 million, plus $250, as provided in the Listing. Premier is also 
entitled to prejudgment interest given that the amount of Premier's brokerage fee was 
mathematically certain and fixed as of the date Sieg conveyed the Property to MJTM. 
Further, as the prevailing party, Premier is entitled to its reasonable attorneys' fees and 
costs, to be determined by the district court on remand. 
This Court should reverse the ruling of the district court, and should remand to the 
district court with instructions to enter judgment in favor of Premier for $91,250, plus 
prejudgment interest, plus reasonable attorneys' fees and costs, in an amount to be 
determined by the district court. 
ARGUMENT 
In the complaint, Premier alleges that Sieg breached the Listing when he conveyed 
title to the Property to MJTM without paying the promised 7% brokerage commission 
plus $250.00. Sieg's obligations under the Listing are governed by contract principles. 
A basic rule of contract interpretation is that the determination of a contract's meaning 
and legal affect are questions of law for determination by the court. Faulkner v. 
Farnsworth, 714 P.2d 1149, 1150 (Utah 1986); Wade v. Stangl, 869 P.2d 9, 11 (Utah 
App. 1994). The intent of the parties is determined from the language in the contract 
itself and, in the absence of ambiguity, the contract must be construed and understood in 
its plain, ordinary and proper sense, according to the meaning derived from the plain 
wording of the contract. Ron Case Roofing and Asphalt Paving, Inc. v. Blomquist, 773 
P.2d 1382, 1385 (Utah 1989). 
In this case, Sieg entered into an exclusive listing agreement with Premier. R. at 
109, THJ 1 and 2. This type of real estate listing "has been universally upheld." Chumney 
v. Stott, 381 P.2d 84, 86 (Utah 1963). The type of transaction that will entitle a broker to 
its commission is determined by the intent of the parties as shown in the listing 
agreement. Gump & Ayers Real Estate, Inc. v. Domcoy Investors, 733 P.2d 128, 130 
(Utah 1987); see also Kahler, Inc. v. Weiss, 539 N.W.2d 86, 90 (S.D. 1995) (listing 
agreement provided for payment of commission on sale which included exchange or 
trade, and court found that an exchange or trade was made as a matter of law). Like the 
listing agreement in the Domcoy Investors case, the Listing provided "for the payment of 
a [seven] percent commission, irrespective of whether the [PJroperty [was] sold, leased, 
or exchanged by plaintiffs, defendants, or any other party during the contract period." 
Domcoy Investors, 733 P.2d at 130. The Listing provided that Premier was entitled to its 
commission once a party was located who was "ready, willing and able to buy, lease, or 
exchange (collectively referred to as 'acquire') the Property, or any part thereof, at. . . any 
other price or terms to which the Owner may agree in writing ...." R. at 109, % 1. 
Sieg does not dispute that he was obligated to pay Premier the agreed brokerage 
fee if the Property had been sold, leased or exchanged during the term of the Listing for 
consideration. It is undisputed that Sieg conveyed title to the Property to MJTM during 
the term of the Listing. Accordingly, the resolution of this dispute turns on whether the 
conveyance to MJTM was for consideration and whether the conveyance was a sale, 
lease or exchange under the Listing. 
On December 6, 2000, the district court signed the Order in which the court denied 
Plaintiff Premier Van Schaack Realty, Inc.'s Motion for Summary Judgment and its 
Motion to Strike Portions of Affidavits of Michael G. Davis, Thomas K. Sieg and Victor 
R. Ayers, and granted Defendant Thomas K. Sieg's Motion for Summary Judgment. R. 
at 382-83. The court gave as its reason for granting Sieg's Motion for Summary 
Judgment the court's conclusion that there was lack of consideration. R. at 383. 
Nonetheless, the court erred in concluding that Sieg's conveyance of the Property to 
MJTM lacked consideration to support Sieg's contractual obligation to pay Premier's 
brokerage fee as provided in the Listing. 
Sieg received consideration from MJTM for his conveyance to MJTM of the 
Property. Also, the conveyance to MJTM was a conveyance to a separate entity, which 
constituted a sale or exchange, entitling Premier to its agreed brokerage fee. This Court 
should reverse the ruling of the district court, and remand with instructions to the district 
court to enter judgment in favor of Premier for its brokerage fee in the amount of 
$91,250, plus prejudgment interest at 10% per annum from January 21, 1998 to the date 
of judgment, plus Premier's reasonable costs and attorneys' fees, including attorneys' 
fees on appeal. 
L SIEG RECEIVED CONSIDERATION FOR HIS CONVEYANCE OF THE 
PROPERTY TO MJTM. 
In the district court, as well as on appeal in connection with Sieg's Motion for 
Summary Affirmance, Sieg argued that he is not obligated to pay the agreed brokerage 
commission provided for in the exclusive listing agreement with Premier because there 
was a lack of consideration for Sieg's transfer of the Property to MJTM. See, e.g., R. at 
295-301. The district court gave as its reason for granting Sieg's Motion for Summary 
Judgment the court's conclusion that there was lack of consideration. R. at 383. 
Sieg received in exchange for his transfer of the Property to MJTM (1) an 
agreement by MJTM to assume $580,000 in liabilities owed by Sieg, which was 
implemented in part when MJTM paid off $300,000 in liabilities owed by Sieg with 
proceeds of the loan MJTM obtained from Zions First National Bank at the time Sieg 
conveyed the Property to MJTM, (2) an initial balance in his MJTM capital account of 
$670,000, (3) a 40% interest in MJTM, and (4) a promised 9% priority return on his 
initial capital contribution. As a matter of law, these benefits constituted consideration 
for the conveyance of the Property by Sieg to MJTM. 
"Sufficiency of consideration is not necessarily measured in terms of money value 
equivalents. If one party asks for and receives something which he would not otherwise 
be entitled to from the other, that is adequate consideration." Gorgoza v. Utah State Road 
Comm'n, 553 P.2d 413, 416 (Utah 1976). "It matters not that this may or may not have 
proved to be of much actual value." Id. 
MJTM's assumption and payment of Sieg's debt constituted consideration beyond 
any dispute. Not only did MJTM agree in the MJTM Operating Agreement to assume 
$580,000 in debts owed by Sieg, but in implementing the Operating Agreement, MJTM 
actually paid off $300,000 of those debts with proceeds from the loan MJTM received 
from Zions First National Bank at the time Sieg conveyed the Property to MJTM. There 
is no question that Sieg bargained for MJTM to assume $580,000 in debts he owed, and 
that he received not only assumption of debt, which he was not otherwise entitled to, but 
also immediate payment by MJTM of $300,000 of the assumed debt. 
In the one reported case in which a court addressed the obligation of an individual 
to pay a brokerage fee upon conveying property subject to an exclusive listing to a 
limited liability company of which the individual was a member, the court discussed the 
two primary issues relevant to resolution of this dispute. 55ee Hagan v. Adams Prop. 
Assocs., 253 Va. 217, 482 S.E. 2d 805 (Va. 1997) (a copy of the Hagan case is included 
in the Addendum for the Court's convenience). In an attempt to avoid paying the agreed 
brokerage fee, the individual argued that his transfer to the limited liability company "did 
not constitute a sale because he did not receive any present valuable consideration for his 
contribution." Id. at 219, 482 S.E.2d at 807. Like Sieg, the individual argued that, 
"while his contribution determined what share of the ownership of the company he was 
entitled to receive, a new business such as [the limited liability company] 'involves an 
expectation of future profits and is always speculative.9" Id. 
The Hagan court rejected this argument. The court pointed out that, like in this 
case, the limited liability company agreed to assume all liabilities existing on the 
property, including the balance owing on the first deed of trust note. Id. The court 
stated: 
The record does not indicate whether the holder of the first 
deed of trust note released [the individual] and substituted 
[the limited liability company] as the obligor on the note. 
Even assuming such substitution did not occur, [the 
individual] nevertheless received substantial relief from his 
debt obligation because, upon assuming all liabilities on the 
property, [the limited liability company] became liable to [the 
individual] for any amount [the individual] would have had to 
pay the holder of the first deed of trust note. 
Id. The Hagan court concluded that the limited liability company's assumption of debt, 
combined with a secured right to a preferential payment on sale of the property (like the 
agreed preferential return Sieg received in this case) and the interest the individual 
received in the limited liability company, constituted valid consideration. Id. at 219-20, 
482 S.E.2d at 807. 
Likewise, in this case, the record does not reflect whether the holders of the 
obligations MJTM agreed to assume substituted MJTM for Sieg as the obligor on those 
obligations. But the record does reflect that, to implement the Operating Agreement, 
effectively simultaneously with Sieg's conveyance of the Property to MJTM, MJTM 
acquired a $1,413 million loan from Zions First National Bank, $300,000 of which was 
used to pay off the $300,000 loan in Sieg's name secured by a lien on the Property. It is 
true that, as a condition to making the $1.413 million loan to MJTM, Zions First National 
Bank required a guaranty agreement from Sieg as well as from Vaughn, Johnson and 
Davis. Nonetheless, MJTM was primarily liable on the loan, and the members' 
guaranties involved only secondary liability. But for the MJTM Operating Agreement, 
Sieg was not otherwise entitled to have MJTM pay off the $300,000 in liabilities, and that 
payment constituted consideration for Sieg's transfer of the Property to MJTM. 
As a matter of law, the benefits Sieg received from MJTM that he was not 
otherwise entitled to, including particularly MJTM's payment of the $300,000 loan in 
Sieg's name secured by a lien on the Property, constituted valid consideration. 
With regard to the interest Sieg received in MJTM and the agreed preferential 
return, Sieg argued below and on appeal in the Memorandum of Points and Authorities in 
Support of Motion for Summary Affirmance (the "Affirmance Memo") that, because the 
consideration given to Sieg by MJTM would have only been valuable to Sieg if MJTM 
were profitable (according to Sieg's argument) and MJTM did not "promise" to be 
profitable or guarantee profitability, there was no consideration for Sieg's transfer of the 
Property to MJTM. See, e.g., Affirmance Memo at 6-8. Sieg's analysis of lack of 
consideration is totally misplaced for numerous reasons. 
First, Sieg is wrong in his assertion that his conveyance of the Property to MJTM 
lacked consideration because MJTM did not promise to be profitable. In fact, MJTM 
made an implied promise to use reasonable efforts to attain profitability, insofar as such 
an implied promise is necessary for the contract to be enforceable (as discussed below, 
Sieg's conveyance of the Property to MJTM was supported by consideration without 
imposing any implied promise of profitability in the MJTM Operating Agreement). This 
concept was first firmly established in the United States in the seminal case of Wood v. 
Duff-Gordon, 222 N.Y. 88, 90-91, 118 N.E. 214, 214 (N.Y. 1917). 
In the Wood case, a designer entered into a contract with a marketer who was to 
have the exclusive right, subject to the designer's approval, to place the designer's 
endorsement on designs of others, and the marketer was to have the exclusive right to sell 
or license the designer's designs. In exchange, the designer was to receive one-half of all 
profits and revenues derived from contracts the marketer might make. In defense of an 
action by the marketer for the designer's breach of the agreement by placing her 
endorsement on designs without the marketer's knowledge, the designer argued that the 
contract failed for lack of consideration (also referred to as lack of mutuality of 
consideration or illusory consideration) because the marketer did not bind himself to 
anything, in effect arguing that the marketer did not promise or guarantee effort that 
would lead to profitability. The court rejected that argument, stating: 
It is true that [the marketer] does not promise in so many 
words that he will use reasonable efforts to place the 
defendant's indorsements [sic] and market her designs. We 
think, however, that such a promise is fairly to be implied. 
The law has outgrown its primitive stage of formalism when 
the precise word was the sovereign talisman, and every slip 
was fatal. 
Id. 
In a more recent and analogous case, the court considered the argument that a 
partnership agreement was not enforceable because there was no promise or guarantee 
that the partnership would be profitable. In Non-Linear Trading Co. v. Braddis Assocs., 
243 A.D.2d 107, 675 N.Y.S.2d 5 (N.Y. App. Div. 1998), the plaintiff made a capital 
contribution in cash to a partnership with the intent that the partnership would develop a 
marketable product. Under the terms of the partnership agreement, returns to the plaintiff 
would only come after $400,000 of net operating profits were first used by the 
partnership to fund additional research. The trial court dismissed a claim for breach of 
the partnership agreement because the court concluded that the partnership agreement 
was unenforceable. Although the appellate court concluded that there was no breach of 
the partnership agreement, the appellate court disagreed that the partnership agreement 
was unenforceable. The Non-Linear Trading court stated "[i]t is settled that a party's 
promise to use best efforts to accomplish the purpose of an agreement is valid 
consideration that will be implied, if necessary, to avoid failure of the contract for lack of 
mutuality, especially where the parties have indicated the intent to be contractually bound 
...." Id. at 114, 675N.Y.S.2datlO. 
As explained by a leading contracts treatise: 
The tendency of the law is to avoid the finding that no 
contract arose due to an illusory promise when it appears that 
the parties intended a contract. ... Frequently a court will 
find an apparently illusory promise to be accompanied by an 
implied promise to use "best efforts" or "reasonable efforts." 
... An implied obligation to use good faith is enough to avoid 
the finding of an illusory promise. 
2 Joseph M. Perillo & Helen H. Bender, Corbin on Contracts § 5.28, at 149-50 (rev. ed. 
1995). Of course, under Utah law, "every contract is subject to an implied covenant of 
good faith and fair dealing ...." Malibu Inv. Co. v. Sparks, 2000 UT 30, ^ 19, 996 P.2d 
1043. 
While no promise will be implied which contradicts or adds to a specific express 
promise in the agreement, Woodland Theatres, Inc. v. ABC Intermountain Theatres, Inc., 
560 P.2d 700, 703 (Utah 1977), MJTM's implied promise to use reasonable efforts to 
achieve pi of itabilit) does :t tot cot ltradict i 101 add to ait \y express pi omise contaii led in the 
MJTM Operating Agreement. Sieg and MJ I M clear!) intended t<* he bru i >•••. \ 
MJTM Operating Agreement, The parties operated under \\w -1 >permmg 
Agreeme. . • ves^ i 
aiosi", an implied promise existed on the part of MJTM to use reasonable efforts to 
become profitable. Alternativelx llv MJTM Operating Agreement does not involve an 
illusory promise on the pa^ p.ovule Stet> his pielcrenh.il icliim 'iu'l II^ 
p n e n t a ^ e ownership IHY.II ' hnl ''ovrnant of good faith. . 
Further, whether or not Sieg's 40% membership interest in MJTM had guaranteed 
value commensurate with his initial capital contribution, Sieg bargained !<•? . s. * K\ < • <i 
*aerwisc have been eniiii^d tw day ownership interest ^ AiJiAl. Whether 01 ;iot 
Sieg's agreed 9% preferential return from MJTM had any actual value to Sieg based on 
MJ"1 •'• ^ profitability, Sieg bargained for ai id received the proi i: rise ft 01 i 1 1\ 1 1 1 f\ I : f a 
p l - , ; r - ti !i i I 'before an) pi oc eeds w ere distributed to Vaughn, Johnson and Davis as 
provided in the MJTM Operating Agreement, and Sieg would not otherwise have been 
entitled to that preferential return from MJIIl1 
I'd I I IM >k av-iiniplinii nl Mir nbli;>nliiiir, nv\nl h\ 'iitjj, Including \u w\ icntof the 
$300,000 loan in Sieg's name secured b) a lien on the Property; the interest received by 
Sieg in MJTM, including the initial balance in his MJTM capital account of $6 / 0,000 ai id 
his 4()c! o ii iterest ii I l\ 1 J' I IN 1; ai id Sic g' s p i oi i lised 9° o pi ioi it> i e ti HI: it i : i 1 I us ii liti 
contribution constituted valid consideration. 
II. SIEG'S CONVEYANCE OF THE PROPERTY TO MJTM, A LIMITED 
LIABILITY COMPANY, WAS A "SALE" OR "EXCHANGE" UNDER 
THE EXCLUSIVE LISTING AGREEMENT. 
There are various cases that address the effect on an exclusive listing agreement or 
similar arrangement of a conveyance of the subject property to a partnership or joint 
venture of which the owner is a partner, with varying results. See, ej*., Salt Lake Knee & 
Sports Rehabilitation, Inc. v. Salt Lake City Knee & Sports Medicine, 909 P.2d 266, 269-
70 (Utah Ct. App. 1995) (transfer was a sale), cert, denied, 925 P.2d 963 (Utah 1996); 
Cooley Inv. Co. v. Jones, 780 P.2d 29, 31 (Colo. Ct. App. 1989) (transfer not a sale or 
exchange); Miller, Cowherd & Kerver, Inc. v. De Montejo, 406 So.2d 1196, 1197-98 
(Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1981) (transfer not a sale); Dahdah v. Continent Realty, Inc., 434 
So.2d 997, 998-99 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1983) (agreement to jointly develop property not a 
sale or exchange). None of these cases addresses the effect on an exclusive listing 
agreement or similar arrangement of a transfer of property from an individual to a limited 
liability company of which the individual is a member. In fact, the cited cases outside of 
Utah were decided before a limited liability company was established as a legal entity by 
the Utah legislature in 1991. 
In Salt Lake Knee & Sports Rehabilitation, Inc. v. Salt Lake City Knee & Sports 
Medicine, 909 P.2d 266 (Utah Ct. App. 1995), cert, denied, 925 P.2d 963 (Utah 1996),2 
this Court considered whether a transfer of property from a partnership to a new joint 
venture constituted a "sale," triggering liability to a third party. In that case, a 
2
 A copy of the Salt Lake Knee case is included in the Addendum for the Court's 
convenience. 
together providing medical and phv^i^al ihuup> ^civic^o ai a cuilain iacilit) locale^ A\ 
Salt Lake City pursuai it to a pi ofrvdonal services eontia* t. When the parties terminated 
i^.ii * nntract, tiie\ enu u-a ao an agreement (the " I em: lii latioi i < Vgreei nei it ) "vv 1 n : \ i 
: < • ' M cuiuine sold the entire 
facility to any third party such that the third party took over complete operatioi lal coi lti ol 
and used the name of the facility, Sports Rehabilitation would be entitled to one-thud of 
Sports Medicine sold an undivided one hall* mteiost in the facility to IHC Hospitals 
("IHC"). Hid TIT^ aid Sports Medicine each transferred their one-half interest to a new 
joint venrure m. . ,:;., •*< . ; .: - a 
Med? .! Rehabili*,- i f ihe entire facility, Uic ball JLUKC I\,ICI 
court considered whether fh> Tanska In ^povi; Medicine of its interests to the joint 
venture constituted ^a le u. a third party. 
• .bait Lake Rnui , il tv\\-\ to! Sfiurh IV *• 
assets to the joint v enture could not be a sale to a third party because it w a^  a LU-OW n-— JI 
the joint venture This Court ruled that, because under Utah law a joint venture is a 
Termination Agreement. Salt Lake Knee, 909 P.2d at 269. 
Although under the common law, a partnership was not considered an entity 
distinct fi oi n its partners, Wal 1 Inv. v. Garden Gate Distnb., Inc., 593 P.2< 1 542, 5 14 
(Utah 1979), as eai 1> as 1898, the I Itah Supreme Coi it t i ecognized tl lat i n idei the I Itah 
partnership statute, a partnership is a separate entity from its partners: "The firm had a 
legal existence, and a name by which it was capable of doing business and of being sued, 
and to that extent it had, in law, a separate and distinct existence from natural persons. In 
law there were four persons; the one was artificial, and with a more limited capacity." 
Hamner v. B.K. Bloch & Co., 52 P. 770, 771 (Utah 1898). The Utah Supreme Court has 
since reiterated that a partnership is a separate legal entity from its partners. Wall Inv., 
593 P.2d at 544; Cottonwood Mall Co. v. Sine, 767 P.2d 499, 500-01 (Utah 1988). 
The entity to which Sieg conveyed the Property in this case was a limited liability 
company, not a partnership. Like a corporation or limited partnership, a limited liability 
company is entirely a creature of statute. See Wall Inv., 593 P.2d at 544. By statute in 
Utah, a limited liability company is a separate legal entity from its members under the 
Utah Limited Liability Company Act. See Utah Code Ann. §§ 48-2b-105(l), -109(1), 
-112 & -127(1) (1998 & Supp. 2000). 
The one case, discussed above, addressing the obligation of an owner of property 
subject to an exclusive listing to pay a brokerage fee upon conveying the property to a 
limited liability company of which the owner is a member found that the transfer to the 
limited liability company constituted a sale entitling the real estate broker to receive the 
brokerage fee agreed to in the listing agreement. Hagan, 253 Va. 217, 220, 482 S.E.2d 
805, 807 (Va. 1997). The Hagan court concluded that a limited liability company is an 
entity separate from its members under Virginia law, and thus the transfer of property to 
the limited liability company was a transfer from one entity or person to another. Id. at 
220, 482 S.E.2d at 807. Based on the court's conclusion that the conveyance was 
legal entil), the coaii hdd tliai UIL, transfer was a sale oi Lhw piupciij, and liiai uie biokci 
was therefore entitled to its brokerage fee. Id. 
•v i lagan \ (IM Mi'i' - * ' : 1 ' : 
was a transfer to a separate enuiy, and thu benefits received in s i r^ constituted valid 
consideration for Sicg's transfer of iln PI.M^IIV \^ \ p T M Tnu:->, Sieg\s conveyance of 
tl i.e Property to - '•• i was a sa*c i>; iu i ropertv, \Ai.,.i, ••. i-m gave rise to N; 'C 
obligatioi i to pa) Pren tier's brokerage fee - . -
PREMIER WAS NOT iIN INSURER Of SIEG'S FAILED BUSINESS 
VENTURE. 
I ),i ei riiei is et it i t led to its agi eed bi okerage fee v • II: iet::l ie:t 01 :t tot !\ ! I I IV I i i l t i i :t lat :::::;;l;; 
failed to fully accomplish its purpose such that there was arguably failure of 
consideration It: is well established :u ITfah ML- .» "broker is noi .i:> !n>iid o r '% 
subseqi lent perionnanoe of the a ,-;.iu a-^ ., iioi ..|,» ;*; ;._: . r> a commission 
by the failure or : n -: «• " ! - u \ ^ > • - 4 : •* " iJushnell keal rotate, inc. \ . iMelson, 
672 P.2d 746,, •. i tah p)S.<): F.M.A. Fin. Corp. v. Build, Inc.. 404 l\2\ M70, 672 
(Utah 1965) (Broker "cannot be held to be::: • an insurer against the possibility that the buyer 
rescission [sic]."). 
Sieg conveyed the Property to MJTM without Premier's knowledge or input jr 
Sieg n lade • a bad Jeal foi 1 lit i lself it t exchange foi his c oi lveyai ice of the I h opei t::;; to 
MJTM, he has no one to blame but himbcll. flic iact is that he did convey the Property 
to MJTM, he received valid consideration to support the enforceability of the applicable 
provisions of the Operating Agreement, MJTM operated pursuant to the Operating 
Agreement for over one year and Sieg ultimately bought out the other members in MJTM 
with the assistance of Karl Malone, dissolved MJTM and sold a percentage interest in the 
Property to Malone. Whether or not MJTM worked out exactly as anticipated by Sieg, 
Premier is entitled to its commission given that Sieg conveyed the Property to MJTM 
during the term of Premier's exclusive listing agreement for an agreed value of $1.3 
million and received valid consideration. 
This Court should reverse the ruling of the district court, and remand with 
instructions to the district court to enter judgment in favor of Premier. 
IV. THE COURT SHOULD REMAND WITH INSTRUCTIONS TO ENTER 
JUDGMENT IN FAVOR OF PREMIER IN THE AMOUNT OF $91,250, 
BASED ON THE AGREED VALUE FOR MJTM'S ACQUISITION OF THE 
PROPERTY IN THE OPERATING AGREEMENT. 
The Listing provided: 
If, during the Listing Period, Coldwell Banker Premier 
Realty, the Listing Agent, the Owner, another real estate 
agent, or anyone else locates a party who is ready, willing and 
able to buy, lease, or exchange (collectively referred to as 
"acquire") the Property, or any part thereof, at the listing 
price and terms stated on the attached board/association 
property data information form, or any other price or terms to 
which the Owner may agree in writing, the Owner agrees to 
pay to Coldwell Banker Premier Realty a brokerage fee in the 
amount of seven percent (7%) of such acquisition price; in 
addition, there will be a two hundred fifty dollar ($250.00) 
charge at the time of closing. 
M J T M constituted a sale suppuitcd by \ a l i c consideration, uni l l ing Premier i«_ As a y . e d 
brokerage fee. 
Oi i • : »i c i.l : >oi it S e p t e m b c i 2 6 , 199' 7 aftei si: K, :t i tc i i, 1:1 i::: , c f it i :  gc >tiatii lg v ' Hi 1 i D , it ! - i 5, 
Vaughn and Johnson, Sicv ai-iced in writing in the Operating Agreement to the terms of 
the transaction, ii rv olving the «. *»n\ eyan.ee of the Property h\ Sies;. U> MJTM. ~ V papies 
to the Operating Agreement agreed ii i. \:v i itii lg tl lat tl i.e v alue -. • : Property v •? 
\ vas acquit ii lg :fi oi it i Sieg w as $1. 3 i :t lillic i i. R at 93-94; 1 ) 3 In Sieg 's Mei i ic: >:t: ai ldi it :t i :i:t :t 
Response to Plaintiff's Request for Summary Judgment ihu in Support ^f Defendant 's 
Motion for Summary Judgment (the "Opposition Memo") , Sieg admitted that the agreed 
dispute that the 7% brokerage fee is appropriately calculated using that agreed value. See 
R at 237. 
Basec .. . ^ piam anbiguous terms o f t ! ic Operating Agreement, Premier 
*K ' *••• s- n m i i « ^ . • - • .; t l ,e ,* ' . . . 
Court should remand the ea ^  M HK disin : J H ; ; ! with instructu- • u C H I T judgment in 
favor -A Premu : u>i i • rokerage fee of $91. .000 pl/i is $250, based oi i tl le terms of 
T H E C O U R T S H O U L D ALSO R E M A N D F O R E N T R Y OF J U D G M E N I IN 
FAVOR OF PREMIER A W A R D I N G IT P R E J U D G M E N T INTEREST, PLUS 
REASONABLE COSTS A N D ATTORNEYS' FEES. 
Prejudgn iei it interest i i ia> be awai ded. ii i a case si ic: 1 i a s this x\\ 1 iei e tl le loss is 
fixed as of a particular time and the at i IOUI it of tl le loss can be calculated with 
mathematical accuracy." Jorgensen v. John Clay and Co., 660 P.2d 229, 233 (Utah 
1983); see also Domcoy Investors, 733 P.2d at 129 (trial court granted summary 
judgment awarding prejudgment interest in case with similar facts). The amount of the 
broker's fee in this case was fixed in the Listing and can be calculated with mathematical 
accuracy based on the value of the Property agreed in the Operating Agreement. Further, 
Premier's entitlement to the brokerage fee was fixed as of January 21, 1998, when Sieg 
conveyed the Property to MJTM, at the latest. Premier is entitled to prejudgment interest 
on its broker's fee of $91,250 at the statutory rate of 10% from January 21, 1998 until 
judgment is entered. Utah Code Ann. § 15-1-1(2). 
Also, in Utah, attorneys' fees can be awarded to the prevailing party if provided 
for by contract, by statute, or if the Court, in exercise of its inherent equitable power, 
deems it appropriate in the interest of justice and equity to award reasonable attorneys' 
fees. Stewart v. Utah Pub. Serv. Comm'n, 885 P.2d 759, 782 (Utah 1994). When a 
contract provides for an award of attorneys' fees, they are awarded as a matter of legal 
right. Cabrera v. Cotrell, 694 P.2d 622, 625 (Utah 1985). 
The Listing provides, "in case of the employment of an attorney in any matter 
arising out of this Listing Agreement (including a sale of the Property) the prevailing 
party shall be entitled to receive from the other party all costs and reasonable attorney's 
fees, whether the matter is resolved through court action or otherwise." R. at 110, ^ 8. 
As the appropriately prevailing party, Premier is contractually entitled to receive an 
award of its reasonable attorneys' fees and costs, and Sieg is not entitled to recover either 
his fees or costs. The district court has not determined the reasonable amount of 
I }t en lier's attoi i ie;; s5 fees ai id costs, citl ie t at ti ial : t 01 i • i: •. * n 
Cour t remands the case to the district coin! -A uh instructions to enter judgment m la\ <>• .»f 
Premier, the remand should be with fi irther instructions +^ dcuamme and aw i : ^ e a a e r 
its i easonable attoi i ie> s' ' fees a:t id costs, botl i ii i till ie disti ict coi it 11 it id 01 i appeal 
In the unlikely event that this Coui t affirms the grant of summary judgment in 
favor of Sieg, the Court should nonetheless reverse tl ic trial coin t 's grant of at torney's 
fees ajisi , osts. ; iuici i lah . * i. , ,u K . . i s U d ^ .. . ae reasonableness 01 
Dixie State Bank, 764 P.2d 985, 988 (Utah 1988). I o make this determination li«m- • 
the trial court must consider various fac:«M- including >a~ natnr- <a t|K A, I • 
perfoi n led, 11 ic 1 « 1 i 11 1 ::l 1 • :)f tl ie \ ' ' 0:1 k ; • 
customary billing rates in the locality, and other circumstances. See id. at 990; see also 
Cabrera, 694 P.2d at 625 (factors lo consider in determining reasonableness of at torneys ' 
number of hours, fees customarily charged in locality, amount involved in case, and 
expertise and experience of attorneys it i\ olved) A pat t:y u l - - m a \ be entitled to 
at torneys5 fees is obl iga ted to presen t suf ficient e\ idence to the ti ial court to allow the 
trial c { -. labrera \ . m u r e ! 1, 694 I ;> 2< 11 it 624 
Rule 4-505(
 y ; * iiu _ tali <'ode ni Judicial Administration also requires that 
"[affidavits in support of an award of attorney fees must be filed witl 1 the court and set 
attorney, the number of hours spent to prosecute the claim to judgment, or the time spent 
in pursuing the matter to the stage for which attorney fees are claimed, and affirm the 
reasonableness of the fees for comparable legal services." 
Sieg failed to present the required evidence to establish the reasonableness of the 
requested attorneys' fees. In the Affidavit for Attorney Fees submitted by Sieg, counsel 
merely stated that he performed 37.6 hours of attorney time at the rate of $150.00 per 
hour and that an associate performed 160.3 hours of work at a rate of $90.00 per hour. R. 
at 338. Sieg failed to satisfy the dictate of Rule 4-505(1) that the affidavit set forth 
specifically (1) the legal basis for the award, (2) the nature of the work performed, and 
(3) the number of hours spent. Counsel does not even attempt to describe the actual work 
performed, nor the amount of time spent on any task, in order that the trial court could 
have assessed the reasonableness of the requested fees. See R. at 337-39. Without this 
evidence, the trial court could not "assess the reasonableness of the number of hours 
spent on the case or the fee customarily charged in the area for similar services. Nor 
could the court assess the efficiency of the attorneys who worked on the litigation." 
Cottonwood Mall Co. v. Sine, 830 P.2d 266, 269 (Utah 1992). Counsel's conclusory assertion 
in the affidavit that the "charge and the work performed in this matter is reasonable and 
in keeping with rates normally charged in the State of Utah for actions of this type" did 
not satisfy Sieg's burden nor allow the trial court to make its required assessment. See R. 
at 337-38. 
Also, a party seeking attorneys' fees must "distinguish between work done that was 
subject to a fee award and work that was not." Cottonwood Mall Co. v. Sine, 830 P.2d at 269. 
Without any description of the work performed, the trial court was unable to assess whether the 
work pet foi n iecl was all appi o{ :»i iately con ipei isable, as i eqi lii ed t u idei 1 Itah law Id. : ' ' it! 101 it the 
supporting evidence which I Itah law requires the trial court to review in detei n lining the 
reasoiiatilciicss of i equested atton \cy s' fees ai id costs, the trial court abused :is di-cretior in 
awarding Sieg the requested but unsupported attorneys' fees and costs. 
C O N C L U S I O N 
I he district coin t 's ( h tnbt i 0, MMHl U r d u , .is . . upp lunrn ln l l> ml . I Vi embi 
2000 Minute Entry should be reversed. 1 Ins Court should remand the ease to the district 
court ".'!.., u.sti.i. .i >nc- to e~ frr judgment in *hvr-r ~r !V*miu ,ii>M -Niin-- Sieg for 
i \-. • • • • - • • ^ < 'V
 i;.. judgment i« 
entered, p lus Premier ' s reasonable costs and at torneys ' fees bo th m IIK d; ;:- -
on appeal, in an amount to be determined by the district court. 
mi h\ I Id ) iht> / / oa> in ^eptei i iot i , zuOl. 
PARSONS BEHLE & LATIMER 
P'fttJl D. VEASY 7] 
R. DAVID GRANT {•• •' 
Attorneys for Plaintiff ;i in I Appd l .mt 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that on this J'/ day of September, 2001,1 caused to be 
mailed, first class, postage prepaid, two true and correct copies of the foregoing BRIEF 
OF THE APPELLANT to: 
Dean L. Gray 
John F. Gray 
LIAPIS & GRAY, L.C. 
175 West 200 South, Suite 2004 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101 
Attorneys for Defendant and Appellee 
*~Jl&\. 
Paul D. Veasy 
DETERMINATIVE PROVISIONS 
1 If til ( ml i \ i i i i i} 4N-.!I>-1 ()''.< I ) : 
( , ; - .. .. liimi'- 1 liability coi i ipai ly orgat lized ai id existing 
under this chapu,: a u } . 
(a) sue or be sued, or institute or di'icud anv action 
arbitration, or proceeding, whether judiciii* -immisfrative. or 
otherwise, in its own name; 
(b) purchase, take, iccci\c, !iasi\ or otherwise acquire, own,, 
hold, improve, u^c o? otherwise dra! ; 5 with real or 
personal properh or ,in an - - 1 - m ?« /: •••• personal property, 
wherever situate-! 
(e) seli come) nortgage, pledge, create a security interest 
in. L-ase. exchange oi han-X» 01 ^IIKTWINO dispose of jl 
MI> r-M'i of" its property or assets; 
{dj »u»d ^HMH^
 Lo and otherwise assist its ei i iplo] ' ees ai id 
managers; 
(e) purchase, take, receive, subscribe MM. ~~ otherwise 
acquire, own, hold, vote, use, employ, sell, mortgage, lend, 
pledge, otherwise dispose of, or otherwise use or deal in or 
with: 
(i) shares or other interests in or obligations of other foreign 
or domestic limited liability companies, domestic or foreign 
corporations, associations, general or limited partnerships, or 
individuals; or 
(ii) direct or indirect obligations of the United States or any 
other government, state, territory, governmental district, or 
municipality or of anv instrumentality of thenr 
(1) m;ik.e contracts or guarantees o\ \i\,in liabilities, borrow 
money ai such \AW< of \uw\\^\ as the limited nubility 
company may determine, issue ih *.-»ies hoiuK o; other 
obligations, or secure am n»' IN obligations **\ mortgage or 
pledge of all or any part of its property, franchises, and 
income; 
(g) lend money for any lawful purpose, invest or reinvest its 
funds, or take and hold real or personal property as security 
for the payment of funds so loaned or invested; 
(h) conduct its business and maintain offices and exercise the 
powers granted by this chapter within or without this state, in 
any state, territory, district, or possession of the United States 
or in any foreign country; 
(i) elect or appoint managers and agents of the limited 
liability company, define their duties, and fix their 
compensation; 
(j) make and alter an operating agreement, not inconsistent 
with its articles of organization or with the laws of this state, 
for the administration and regulation of its affairs; 
(k) make donations for the public welfare or for charitable, 
scientific, religious, or educational purposes; 
(1) indemnify a member or manager or any other person to the 
same extent that a partnership may indemnify any of the 
partners, managers, employees, or agents of the partnership 
against expenses actually and reasonably incurred by the 
member or manager in connection with the defense of an 
action, suit, or proceeding, whether civil or criminal, in which 
the member or manager is made a party; 
(m) cease its activities and surrender its certificate of 
organization; 
(n) have and exercise all powers necessary or convenient to 
effect any or all of the purposes for which the company is 
organized; 
(o) transact any lawful business which the members or the 
managers find to be in aid of governmental policy; 
(p) pay pensions and establish pension plans, profit-sharing 
plans, and other incentive plans for any or all of its managers 
and employees; 
-A-2-
(q) be a promoter, incorporaior, genual partnet, limited 
partner, member, associate, -• manager of any corporation, 
partnership, limited partnership, limited liability company, 
joint ventmv. !:n-,t m other enterprise; and 
(r) rendei piofessional services, if each nlember 01 A UHHU : 
liability company who renders professional services in I'tali 
is licensed or registered to render those professional services 
pursuant to applicable Utah bw 
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Supreme Court of Virginia. 
Maureen K. HAGAN, et al. 
v. 
ADAMS PROPERTY ASSOCIATES, INC. 
Record No. 961332. 
Feb. 28, 1997. 
Real estate broker sought recovery of commission after owner transferred 
apartments to limited liability company of which owner was a member. 
The Circuit Court, City of Richmond, Theodore J. Markow, J., ruled that 
broker was entitled to commission. Owner appealed. The Supreme 
Court, Lacy, J., held that: (1) transfer of apartments was a sale, and (2) 
gross sales amount was sum of debt relief that owner received from 
company plus amount of deed of trust note that owner received from 
company. 
Affirmed. 
West Headnotes 
[1] Brokers <§=>39 
65k39 
Apartment owner received valid consideration for his transfer of 
apartments to limited liability company of which he was a member, for 
purpose of determining whether transfer was a sale and thus entitled real 
estate broker to commission; company agreed to assume all liabilities 
existing on property, company became liable to owner for any amount 
owner would have to pay holder of deed note, and company executed 
second deed of trust on property securing note payable to owner. 
[2] Brokers <§^39 
65k39 
Transfer of apartments from owner to limited liability company of which 
he was a member constituted a sale, thus entitling real estate broker to 
commission authorized by listing agreement between owner and broker. 
Code 1950, §§ 13.1-1002 to 13.1-1073. 
[3] Brokers <§=*69 
65k69 
For purpose of determining real estate broker's commission, gross sales 
amount of transfer of apartments from owner to limited liability company 
in which owner was a member was sum of debt relief owner received from 
company plus amount of deed of trust note that owner received from 
company, even though deed of trust note was not due until property was 
sold and was subordinate to first deed of trust note and future development 
loans. 
**806 *218 Joseph W. Kaestner, Richmond (Patricia A. Phillips; 
Kaestner & Pitney, on brief), for appellants. 
Alexander N. Simon, Richmond, for appellee. 
Present: CARRICO, C.J., COMPTON, LACY, HASSELL, KEENAN 
and KOONTZ, JJ., and WHITING, Senior Justice. 
LACY, Justice. 
In this appeal, we consider whether a transfer of real property from its 
owner to a limited liability company in which the owner is a member 
constitutes the sale of the property, entitling a real estate broker to a 
commission authorized by a listing agreement between the owner and 
broker. 
Ralph E. and Maureen K. Hagan (collectively "Hagan") owned the Stuart 
Court Apartments (the property) in Richmond. On April 30, 1994, Hagan 
executed an agreement with Adams Property Associates, Inc. (Adams), 
giving Adams the exclusive right to sell the property for $1,600,000. The 
agreement provided that if the property was "sold or exchanged" within 
one year, with or without Adams' assistance, Hagan would pay Adams a 
fee of six percent of the "gross sales amount." Before the year expired, 
Hagan, Roy T. Tepper, *219 and Lynn Parsons formed a limited liability 
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company, Hagan, Parsons, & Tepper, L.L.C. (HPT). By deed dated April 
23, 1995, Hagan transferred the property to HPT. 
Adams filed a motion for judgment seeking recovery of a commission 
from Hagan pursuant to the April 1994 agreement. The trial court held 
that Adams was entitled to a commission because the transfer of the 
property to HPT constituted a sale of the property. Hagan appealed both 
the determination that a sale of the property occurred and the amount of the 
commission awarded. 
[1] Hagan first contends that transfer of legal title to the property to HPT 
represented his contribution to the capitalization of a new company, and 
capitalization of a new venture should not be classified as the sale of 
property, citing Southpace Properties, Inc. v. Acquisition Group, 5 F.3d 
500, 504 (11th Cir.1993); Cooley Investment Co. v. Jones, 780 P.2d 29, 
31 (Colo. App. 1989); Miller, Cowherd & Kerver, Inc. v. De Montejo, 406 
So.2d 1196, 1198 (Fla.App. 1981); and McElhinney **807 v. Belsky, 165 
Pa.Super. 546, 69 A.2d 178, 181 (1949). Hagan also asserts that the 
transfer did not constitute a sale because he did not receive any present 
valuable consideration for his contribution. Hagan contends that, while his 
contribution determined what share of the ownership of the company he 
was entitled to receive, a new business such as HPT "involves an 
expectation of future profits and is always speculative." We disagree. 
When Hagan transferred the property to HPT, he received more than an 
interest in the new company. Under the terms of the operating agreement 
executed in conjunction with the formation of HPT, HPT agreed to assume 
all liabilities existing on the property, which included the $1,028,000 
unpaid balance on a first deed of trust note on the property. The record 
does not indicate whether the holder of the first deed of trust note released 
Hagan and substituted HPT as the obligor on the note. Even assuming 
such substitution did not occur, Hagan nevertheless received substantial 
relief from his debt obligation because, upon assuming all liabilities on the 
property, HPT became liable to Hagan for any amount Hagan would have 
had to pay the holder of the first deed of trust note. Also as part of the 
property transfer transaction, HPT executed a second deed of trust on the 
property securing a note payable to Hagan for $323,000. This note was 
due and payable when the property was subsequently sold, and it had 
priority over payments to anyone other than the beneficiary of the first 
deed of trust. Thus, in exchange for transfer of title to the property, 
Hagan received relief from his debt on the first deed *220 of trust note as 
well as the benefit of a second deed of trust note and an interest in HPT. 
These benefits received by Hagan constituted valid consideration. Brewer 
v. Bank of Danville, 202 Va. 807, 815, 120 S.E.2d 273, 279 (1961). 
[2] Furthermore, the cases relied on by Hagan for the proposition that the 
contribution of property to a limited liability company is not a sale but the 
capitalization of a new company are inapposite. Those cases involved the 
capitalization of a partnership or entity governed by partnership law. As 
noted in those cases, a partnership is not an entity separate from the 
partners themselves; thus, in such circumstances, there is no transfer of 
property from one person to another, but only a change in the form of 
ownership. Southpace, 5 F.3d at 504; Cooley, 780 P.2d at 31; De 
Montejo, 406 So,2d at 1198; McElhinney, 69 A.2d at 181. In this case, 
however, the new venture was a limited liability company, not a 
partnership. 
Under the Virginia Limited Liability Company Act, Code §§ 13,1-1002 
through 13.1-1073, a limited liability company is an unincorporated 
association with a registered agent and office. §§ 13.1-1002, -1015. It is 
an independent entity which can sue and be sued and its members are not 
personally liable for the debt or actions of the company. §§ 
13.1-1009,-1019. In contrast to a partnership, a limited liability company 
in Virginia is an entity separate from its members and, thus, the transfer of 
property from a member to the limited liability company is more than a 
change in the form of ownership; it is a transfer from one entity or person 
to another. Accordingly, we agree with the trial court's conclusion that 
Hagan transferred the title of the property in exchange for valuable 
consideration and that this transfer was a sale of the property. 
[3] Hagan also complains that in calculating the commission due Adams, 
the trial court used the wrong components to determine the gross sales 
•mount. The trial court calculated the gross sales amount to be the sum of 
debt relief Hagan received from HPT, $1,028,000, plus the amount of the 
•cond deed of trust note which Hagan received from HPT, $323,000. 
:N1] Hagan first asserts that the gross sales amount should be the fair 
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market value of the debt, which is $775,000, the amount Tepper and 
Parsons paid for the first deed of trust note when they purchased it in June, 
1995. We disagree. 
FN1. The parties agree that an arithmetic error occurred in the trial court's 
calculation of the commission and that the proper figures under the court's 
finding are a gross sales amount of $1,351,000 which results in a six percent 
commission of $81,060. 
*221 The status of Hagan's indebtedness was altered when he transferred 
the property to **808 HPT under the terms of the operating agreement, not 
when Tepper and Parsons individually purchased the first deed of trust 
note. The gross sales amount is the consideration which Hagan received 
from HPT, not an amount agreed upon between some other buyer and 
seller at another time. [FN2] 
FN2. Hagan also argues that his debt relief was only the difference between 
the original amount of the note, $1,028,000, and the $775,000 purchase price 
of the note. This position is based on Hagan's contention that he had 
continuing liability for the first deed of trust note, a contention we addressed, 
supra. 
Finally, Hagan asserts that the second deed of trust note should not have 
been included as part of the gross sales amount because it was not due until 
the property was sold and was subordinate to the first deed of trust note 
and future development loans. Under these circumstances, Hagan claims, 
the second deed of trust note had no present value. Again we disagree. 
Whether the second deed of trust note would ultimately result in a payment 
of $323,000 to Hagan is not relevant to the measure of the value ascribed 
to the transaction by the parties at the time of the transaction. There is 
nothing speculative about a second deed of trust note in the amount of 
$323,000. It was part of the agreement surrounding the transfer of 
ownership of the property and represented a portion of the amount Hagan 
was willing to accept for the property. Thus, the trial court properly 
considered the second deed of trust note as consideration received by 
Hagan for the sale of the property and properly included it as part of the 
gross sales amount for purposes of calculating the amount of commission 
due Adams. 
Accordingly, we will affirm the judgment of the trial court holding that 
Hagan's transfer of title to the property to HPT was a sale of the property, 
that Adams was entitled to a commission on the gross sales amount, and 
that the gross sales amount is the debt relief plus the second deed of trust 
note Hagan received, $1,028,000 and $323,000, respectively, resulting in a 
commission of $81,060. 
Affirmed. 
END OF DOCUMENT 
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1. Appeal and Error ©=*934(1) 
ALT LAKE KNEE & SPORTS REHA-
BILITATION, INC., fka Professional 
Therapy, Inc., Plaintiff and Appellant, 
ILT LAKE CITY KNEE & SPORTS 
MEDICINE, a Utah general partnership; 
Lonnie E. Paulos, M.D., P.C., a Utah 
professional corporation; and Thomas 
D. Rosenberg, M.D., P.C., a Utah profes-
sional corporation, general partners, De-
fendants and Appellees. 
No. 940417-CA. 
Court of Appeals of Utah. 
Dec. 21, 1995. 
Physical therapy corporation brought ac-
n against defendant partnership of physi-
ns for failure to pay amounts allegedly due 
>n subsequent "sale" of sports medicine 
dness, as provided for in agreement termi-
ing professional services contract. The 
rd District Court, Salt Lake County, Ho-
r F. Wilkinson, J., granted summary judg-
it for defendant, and denied plaintiffs 
)tion to reconsider." Plaintiff appealed. 
J Court of Appeals, Davis, Associate P. J., 
1 that: (1) plaintiffs substantive motion 
new trial tolled period for filing appeal; P 
new joint venture which acquired busi-
5 was "third party" for purposes of agree-
it; and (3) defendant obtained consider-
n for sale of business' assets. 
Reversed and remanded. 
Bench, J., concurred and dissented, and 
opinion. 
In determining propriety of grant of 
summary judgment, facts are viewed in light 
most favorable to position of losing party. 
Rules Civ.Proc, Rule 56(c), 28 U.S.C.A. 
2. Appeal and Error <&»842(2) 
Trial court's legal conclusions are re-
viewed for correctness. 
3. Motions @=>39 
Rules of civil procedure do not provide 
for "motion for reconsideration" of trial 
court's ruling; however, motions so entitled 
could be considered if they could have prop-
erly been brought under some rule and were 
merely incorrectly titled. 
4. Appeal and Error <®=*345.1 
New Trial ^124(1) 
Although plaintiff in breach of contract 
action improperly entitled motion as "motion 
for reconsideration," after adverse decision 
on summary judgment, motion was in es-
sence motion for new trial, and therefore 
filing motion tolled period for filing appeal; 
trial judge ruled on the motion as if it were 
motion for new trial. Rules Civ.Proc., Rule 
59(a). 
ac_ Like partnerships, joint ventures are 
fSi_ distinct and separate legal entities. U.C.A. 
} u e 1953, 48-1-3.1(1, 2). 
ft Even though defendant partnership was 
I0_ member of new joint venture, new joint ven-
\ _ ture was separate legal entity and as such 
s was "third party" for purposes of defendant 
. partnership's obligation to pay upon subse-
j # > quent sale of sports medicine business to 
o n "third party," under agreement terminating 
alj professional services contract between plain-
si. tiff physical therapy corporation and defen-
ce- clant partnership of physicians. 
ar-
7. Contracts @=>202(1) 
Defendant partnership of physicians re-
ceived consideration for sale of assets of 
rid sports medicine business, for purposes of 
obligation to pay former business associate 
5. Joint Adventures @=>1.1 
6. Contracts <®=>202(1) 
7. Contracts =>202(1) 
O-flULiJ. Xjj^ LtVJCi lYTNJ^Ili K.EJHJ\J}. 
Cite as 909 P.2d 266 
upon subsequent sale of business, where de-
fendant partnership was paid for one half of 
assets and received one half interest in new 
joint venture which assumed complete man-
agement control of business. 
John C. Green and Kim M. Luhn, Salt 
Lake City, for Appellant. 
Mark 0. Morris and Jeffrey T. Sivertsen, 
Salt Lake City, for Appellees. 
Before DAVIS, BENCH and BILLINGS, 
JJ. 
DAVIS, Associate Presiding Judge: 
Appellant, Salt Lake Knee & Sports Re-
habilitation, Inc. (Rehabilitation) challenges 
the trial court's order granting summary 
judgment to appellees, Salt Lake City Knee 
& Sports Medicine (Physicians), a general 
partnership; and its general partners, Lon-
nie E. Paulos, M.D., P.C., a Utah profession-
al corporation (Paulos); and Thomas D. 
Rosenberg, M.D., P.C., a Utah professional 
corporation (Rosenberg). We reverse and 
remand. 
FACTS 
Rehabilitation and Physicians formerly 
worked together providing medical and phys-
ical therapy services at the Salt Lake Sports 
Medicine Center (Center) located at 670 East 
3900 South, Salt Lake City, Utah, under the 
terms of a professional services agreement. 
On May 22, 1989, these parties entered into a 
termination agreement and purchase agree-
ment (Agreement) which terminated the par-
ties' professional services contract. Para-
graph eleven of this Agreement stated: 
Purchase of Center. It is agreed that if 
within two (2) years from the date of this 
Agreement, Physicians sells the Center to 
any third party, Rehabilitation shall be 
entitled to one-third (%) of that portion of 
the purchase price which is attributed to 
good will. 'Sale' shall be defined as a 
transfer wherein the purchaser acquires 
and pays consideration for all of the follow-
ing: The Center's lease on the Leased 
Premises, ownership of the name 'Salt 
Lake Sports Medicine Center,' all of the 
v. &AJLI l^ AJtvja mnjui^mu utan 2(j7 
(UtahApp. 1995) 
equipment and other assets located at the 
Center, the Center's patients and accounts 
receivable, and whereby the purchaser as-
sumes complete operational control of the 
business of the Center and continues oper-
ating under the same name at the same 
location. 
On May 24, 1990, Physicians entered into 
an asset purchase agreement with IHC Hos-
pitals (IHC) pursuant to which Physicians 
sold IHC an undivided one-half interest in 
the Center. Physicians and IHC then 
formed a joint venture called "Sports Medi-
cine West" and transferred their respective 
one-half interests thereto. 
The joint venture continued to do business 
at the Center's location and it temporarily 
retained Physicians as its agent to manage 
and operate the business. At some point in 
time, Sports Medicine West changed the 
Center's name from "Salt Lake Sports Medi-
cine Center" to "Sports Medicine West." 
The parties dispute precisely when Sports 
Medicine West changed the Center's name, 
however it is undisputed that the name was 
not changed until at least one year before the 
action in this case was filed, approximately 
October 1990. 
On October 4, 1991, Rehabilitation filed a 
complaint for declaratory relief, alleging that 
the transactions between IHC and Physi-
cians constituted a "sale" under paragraph 
eleven of the Agreement. Physicians filed a 
motion for summary judgment on June 15, 
1993, and Rehabilitation filed a counter-mo-
tion for summary judgment shortly thereaf-
ter. 
After hearing oral argument on the mo-
tions, the trial court permitted further brief-
ing on the parties' interpretations of the 
meaning of "sale" as defined by the Agree-
ment. On November 15, 1993, the court 
heard additional oral argument on the sub-
ject and ruled that to constitute a sale, the 
transaction "must include all of the following 
. . . items [from paragraph eleven]. And 
from those items, it must . . . [include] all of 
the equipment and assets, and they [the pur-
chaser] must have complete operational con-
trol." The court ruled that the transfer of 
one-half of the interest in the Center to IHC 
the running of the time in which to appeal, 
and hence Rehabilitation's appeal was un-
timely.1 It is by now well established that 
the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure do not 
provide for a "motion for reconsideration" of 
a trial court's ruling. Ron Shepherd Ins., 
Inc. v. Shields, 882 P.2d 650, 653 n. 4 (Utah 
1994); accord Watkiss & Campbell v. Foa & 
Son, 808 P.2d 1061,1064 (Utah 1991). None-
theless, we have "reviewed motions so enti-
tled if they could have properly been brought 
under some rule and were merely incorrectly 
titled." Shields, 882 P.2d at 653 n. 4; see 
also Trembly v. Mrs. Fields Cookies, 884 
P.2d 1306, 1310 n. 2 (Utah App.1994) (noting 
that "the substance, not caption, of a motion 
is dispositive in determining the character of 
the motion"). 
not a sale and rejected Rehabilitation's 
ment that the transfer of all assets to 
joint venture was a "sale." Therefore, 
court granted summary judgment in fa-
of Physicians on November 15, 1993. 
shabilitation filed a "motion for reeonsid-
ion" of the trial court's ruling on Novem-
29, 1993. The trial court heard the 
on on January 28, 1994, and again ruled 
avor of Physicians. An order to this 
it was entered on March 14, 1994. On 
11 11, 1994, Rehabilitation filed this ap-
UES AND STANDARDS OF REVIEW 
,2] There are essentially two issues 
rented on appeal. The first issue con-
is the timeliness of Rehabilitation's ap-
, "[I]t is axiomatic in this jurisdiction 
failure to timely perfect an appeal is a 
sdictional failure requiring dismissal of 
appeal." Prowswood, Inc. v. Mountain 
I Supply Co., 676 P.2d 952, 955 (Utah 
1). The second issue presented is wheth-
he trial court erred in granting summary 
rment to Physicians based upon its con-
ion that the transaction between IHC 
Physicians was not a "sale" within the 
ining of paragraph eleven of the Agree-
lt. Summary judgment is appropriate in 
ise where the pleadings, depositions, an-
rs to interrogatories, and admissions on 
together with any affidavits, show there 
o genuine issue of material fact and that 
moving party is entitled to judgment as a 
teroflaw. Utah R.Civ.P. 56(c); Warbur-
v. Virginia Beach Fed Sav. & Loan 
% 899 P.2d 779, 781 (Utah App.1995). In 
srmiriing the propriety of a grant of sum-
-y judgment, we view the facts in the light 
>t favorable to the position of the losing 
ty. Warburton, 899 P.2d at 781. We 
iew the trial court's legal conclusions for 
rectness. Id. 
ANALYSIS 
1. Timeliness of the Appeal 
3] Physicians argues that Rehabilita-
te motion for reconsideration did not toll 
We have considered Physicians's other argu-
tents on this issue, including the contentions 
tat Rehabilitation simply filed a motion for clar-
ication and that there is some significance to be 
Cached to the timing of the entry of the sum-
[4] In this case, Rehabilitation captioned 
its motion as a motion for reconsideration. 
However, our review indicates that the sub-
stance of the motion was essentially identical 
to a motion for new trial under Rule 59(a) of 
the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. Specifi-
cally, Rehabilitation argued that the trial 
court made several errors of law which are 
grounds for relief under Rule 59(a)(7). In 
addition, by conducting a hearing and reaf-
firming its legal conclusions, the trial court 
ruled upon the motion as if it were a motion 
for a new trial. Therefore, as in Watkiss & 
Campbell, 
[ujnder the facts of this case, the incorrect 
title placed upon the pleading was not a 
bar to defendant's case. Indeed, the rec-
ord reflects that the judge ruled on the 
motion as if it were a motion for a new 
trial. Because the court treated the mo-
tion to reconsider as a motion for a new 
trial, we conclude that the filing of the 
motion tolled the time in which to file an 
appeal. 
We conclude that Rehabilitation's motion 
to reconsider is substantively a motion for a 
mary judgment order, and reject them as being 
without merit. See State v. Allen, 839 P.2d 291, 
303 (Utah 1992); State v. Carter, lit P.2d 886, 
888-89 (Utah 1989), cert, denied, U.S. , 
116 S.Ct. 163, 133 L.Ed.2d 105 (1995). 
Id. at 1064-65 (footnotes omitted). 
new trial, and as such it tolled the time for 
filing an appeal. Rehabilitation's appeal was 
thus timely.2 
2. Summary Judgment 
The trial court granted Physicians's motion 
for summary judgment on the basis that a 
"sale" to a "third" party within the meaning 
of paragraph eleven of the Agreement had 
not occurred. The court stated it was "un-
persuaded" by Rehabilitation's argument 
that all of the assets were transferred to the 
new joint venture, Sports Medicine West. 
Thus, the only transfer considered by the 
court was the transfer of one-half of the 
interest in the Center to IHC. Because a 
transfer of less than "all" of the interest in 
the Center does not trigger the "sale" defini-
tion in paragraph eleven, the court granted 
summary judgment to Physicians. 
The trial court's rationale for rejecting Re-
habilitation's argument that all of the assets 
were transferred to the joint venture, Sports 
Medicine West, is unclear. Physicians 
claims, however, that because it is a co-owner 
of Sports Medicine West, the joint venture 
cannot be a "third party" within the meaning 
of paragraph eleven. We disagree. 
[5] A joint venture is defined as "an asso-
ciation of two or more persons to carry on as 
co-owners of a single business enterprise." 
Utah Code Ann. § 48-1-3.1(1) (1994). Joint 
ventures are subject to the same rules as 
partnerships. Id. § 48-1-3.1(2); Kemp v. 
Murray, 680 P.2d 758, 759 n. 1 (Utah 1984); 
Hoth v. White, 799 P.2d 213, 218 (Utah App. 
1990). Based upon the statutes governing 
partnerships, the Utah Supreme Court has 
ruled that partnerships are distinct and sepa-
rate legal entities. See Cottonwood Mall Co. 
v. Sine, 767 P.2d 499, 501 (Utah 1988) (noting 
several sections of the Uniform Partnership 
Act treating partnership as a separate legal 
entity); Wall Inv. Co. v. Garden Gate Dis-
2. Notwithstanding our conclusion, we are not 
approving the use of pleadings identified as 
something not provided for in the Utah Rules of 
Civil Procedure. Such a practice could seriously 
compromise the position of a litigant where a 
"motion for reconsideration," for example, was 
not substantively a motion enumerated under 
Rule 4(b) of the Utah Rules of Appellate Proce-
dure, or where other litigants or third parties 
acted or failed to act in reliance only on the 
trib., Inc., 593 P.2d 542, 544 (Utah 1979) 
(noting partnership is legal entity distinct 
from partners). Because these statutes ap-
ply equally to joint ventures, it follows that 
joint ventures are also distinct and separate 
legal entities. See Sine, 767 P.2d at 501 
(concluding that joint ventures have capacity 
to sue in their own names, relying on author-
ity treating partnerships as distinct entities). 
[6] We therefore conclude that, under 
Utah law, joint ventures are separate legal 
entities. Our conclusion is consistent with 
rulings in several other jurisdictions. See 
Fairbanks N. Star Borough v. Kandik 
Constr., Inc., 795 P.2d 793, 802 (Alaska 1990) 
(inferentially holding that joint venture is a 
separate legal entity), vacated in part on 
other grounds, 823 P.2d 632 (Alaska 1991); 
First State Serv. Corp. v. Hector's Concrete 
Constr., Inc., 168 Ariz. 442, 814 P.2d 783, 783 
(App.1991) (joint venture is a separate legal 
entity); C.H. Leavell & Co. v. Tax Comm'n, 
450 P.2d 211, 214 (Okla.1968) (same); Lawler 
v. Dallas Statler-Hilton Joint Venture, 793 
S.W.2d 27, 33 (Tex.Ct.App. 1990) (same).3 
But see Lewis v. Gardner Eng'g Corp., 254 
Ark. 17, 491 S.W.2d 778, 779 (1973) (joint 
venture not a separate legal entity); Elting 
Ctr. Corp. v. Diversified Title Corp., 306 
So.2d 542, 543 (Fla.Dist.CtApp.1974) (same), 
cert, denied, 321 So.2d 554 (Fla.1975). As a 
separate legal entity, Sports Medicine West 
is a "third party" within the meaning of 
paragraph eleven. 
[7] In addition, Physicians was paid by 
IHC for an undivided one-half interest in its 
assets, and it received a one-half interest in 
the joint venture for the other one-half of the 
assets. Therefore, the paragraph eleven re-
quirement that consideration be paid for the 
assets was also satisfied. Sports Medicine 
West also has complete operational control of 
the Center as evidenced by the terms of the 
name of the pleading possibly obtained from a 
docket entry. 
3. Louisiana has not adopted the Uniform Part-
nership Act, but also considers joint ventures to 
be separate legal entities. West Feliciana Parish 
Sch. Bd. v. Gulf States Utils. Co,, 486 So.2d 808, 
811 (La.Ct.App. 1986). 
Management Agreement stating that Sports 
Medicine West had complete "day-to day" 
operational control of the rehabilitation busi-
ness. 
Finally, according to the parties, the only 
remaining issue is whether the joint venture 
continued operating the business under the 
name "Salt Lake Sports Medicine Center." 
The trial court did not reach this issue,4 
notwithstanding disputed, material facts, 
having resolved the matter on the issue of 
sale of assets. Because of the existence of 
disputed material facts, the issue of whether 
the joint venture continued to operate the 
business under the same name is remanded 
to the trial court for determination. 
CONCLUSION 
The joint venture Sports Medicine West is 
a distinct and separate legal entity from Phy-
sicians, and from Paulos and Rosenberg, the 
general partners of Physicians. As such, it is 
a "third person" within the meaning of para-
graph eleven. In addition, consideration was 
paid for the assets and Sports Medicine West 
assumed full operational control of the Cen-
ter. Thus, we reverse the trial court's grant 
of summary judgment to Physicians based 
upon the finding that only one-half of the 
assets were transferred to IHC. It appears 
that material issues of fact exist regarding 
the question of whether Sports Medicine 
West continued to operate the Center under 
the same name. We therefore remand the 
matter for further proceedings consistent 
with this opinion. 
BILLINGS, J., concurs. 
BENCH, Judge (concurring and 
dissenting): 
I concur in holding that this appeal was 
timely filed. I dissent, however, from the 
reversal of the summary judgment. 
As to the timeliness of the appeal, I agree 
that Rehabilitation's "motion for reconsidera-
tion" was essentially a Rule 59 motion for a 
new trial. See State v. Parker, 872 P.2d 
4. The trial court also did not reach the subsidiary 
issue of whether to strike the affidavits submitted 
by Rehabilitation. We note however, that even if 
the trial court had struck Rehabilitation's affida-
1041, 1044 (Utah App.) (holding substance of 
post-judgment motion controls, not caption), 
cert, denied 883 P.2d 1359 (Utah 1994). We 
have previously held that a motion for a new 
trial may properly be filed following entry of 
a summary judgment. Moon Lake Elec. 
Ass'n, Inc. v. Ultrasystems W. Constrs., Inc., 
767 P.2d 125, 127 (Utah App.1988). Our 
rules explicitly provide that "the time for 
appeal for all parties shall run from the entry 
of the order denying a new trial." Utah 
R.App.P. 4(b). The filing of a motion under 
Rule 59 therefore tolls the time for filing a 
notice of appeal. 
On the merits, I disagree with the main 
opinion's analysis and result. The contract 
between the parties provides that Physicians 
will share the sale proceeds attributable to 
"good will" only when Physicians sell the 
entire Center to a third party. In the trans-
action involving IHC, Physicians clearly re-
tained an ownership interest in the Center. 
The fact that the Center is now operated 
as a joint venture does not lead to the result 
reached by the main opinion. The joint ven-
ture statute provides that the only way Phy-
sicians can participate in a joint venture is if 
it is a co-owner. See Utah Code Ann. § 48-
1-3.1(1) (1995) ("[a] joint venture is an associ-
ation of two or more persons to carry on as 
co-owners of a single business enterprise.") 
(emphasis added). Since Physicians indis-
putably remains a co-owner of the Center, it 
has not sold it as contemplated by paragraph 
eleven of the parties' agreement. 
I would therefore affirm the summary 
judgment. 
vits, the affidavit submitted by Physicians estab-
lishes nonetheless that the name of the business 
remained unchanged for several months. 
